A suggestion for oversimplifying the theory of money by Neil Wallace
Federal Reserve Bank 
of Minneapolis 
Deposit Insurance Reform; 
or, Deregulation Is the Cart, 
Not the Horse (p. 3) 
John H. Kareken 
Why Markets in Foreign Exchange 
Are Different From 
Other Markets (p. 12) 
Neil Wallace 
A Suggestion for Oversimplifying 
the Theory of Money (p. 19) 
Neil Wallace 
R E P R I N T S 
1989 Contents (p. 21) 
1989 Staff Reports (p. 28) Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
Quarterly Review 
Vol. 14, No.1 ISSN 0271-5287 
This publication primarily presents economic research aimed at improving 
policymaking by the Federal Reserve System and other governmental 
authorities. 
Produced in the Research Department. Edited by Preston J. Miller and 
Kathleen S. Rolfe (Winter 1990), Richard M. Todd and Patricia Lewis 
(Spring 1983), and Arthur J. Rolnick and Alan Struthers, Jr. (Fall 1979). 
Graphic design by Barbara Birr, Public Aftairs Department. 
Address questions to the Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank, 
Minneapolis, Minnesota 55480 (telephone 612-340-2341). 
Articles may be reprinted if the source is credited and the Research 
Department is provided with copies of reprints. 
The views expressed herein are those of the authors and not 
necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis or 
the Federal Reserve System. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 






A Suggestion for Oversimplifying 




Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
and Professor of Economics 
University of Minnesota 
In his well-known paper "A Suggestion for Simplifying 
the Theory of Money," Hicks (1935) said that the main 
challenge facing monetary theory is to face up to the 
frictions that lead people to hold low-yielding, mone-
tary-like assets. Today I want to discuss ways of meet-
ing a slightly revised version of that challenge: how do 
we go about building models which have equilibria in 
which some assets end up having a relatively low re-
turn? 
One response is to say that it is easy to meet Hicks' 
challenge. For example, a model in which the real value 
of outside money is an argument of individuals' utility 
functions or one in which holdings of outside money are 
required to meet a Clower or cash-in-advance con-
straint will meet the challenge if the stock of outside 
money is somehow limited. However, such ways of 
meeting Hicks' challenge seem unconvincing. 
Consider the money-in-the-utility-function model. 
Suppose someone could issue liabilities backed by 
holdings of interest-bearing securities that would com-
pete with outside money in yielding utility. Such 
liabilities could be sold at a price that implies a yield 
lower than the market rate of interest on securities and 
so earn a profit for the issuer. The same possibility 
arises in the cash-in-advance model. As usually ex-
posited (Helpman 1981 and Lucas 1982), in those 
models individuals face a sequence of two constraints at 
each date. First, outside money and securities are 
traded. Then, outside money and goods are traded. But, 
again, if securities bear interest and if someone in the 
first market, the money-securities market, could issue 
liabilities that would trade for goods in the second 
market, then there are potential profits to be earned by 
doing that. So we are left in these models with the 
question: what thwarts these profit opportunities? 
A boorish response to these concerns consists of 
simply repeating the assumptions: utility functions in-
clude outside money, not an aggregate of outside and 
inside money; trading in the goods market requires 
outside money, not either outside or inside money. This 
is a boorish response because it stops conversation and 
leaves us at an impasse. A more forthcoming response 
would display a willingness to discuss the properties of 
outside money that allow it to yield utility or to be used 
for goods purchases and that prevent inside money 
from playing those roles. Perhaps it is because outside 
money is trusted and inside money would not be. Or 
perhaps such substitution of inside for outside money is 
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19 limited because the inside money issuers would want to 
hold reserves in the form of outside money. 
While more forthcoming, these responses are not 
satisfactory. As usually exposited, both money-in-the-
utility-function and cash-in-advance models have per-
fect securities markets in which individuals can borrow 
and lend. If trust is not a problem in those markets, why 
is it a problem for securities that are going to be ex-
changed for goods? Nor does there seem to be a need 
for inside money issuers to hold reserves in such models. 
In them, all the inside money issues would come due at 
the same time and could be paid from the proceeds of 
the assets held as backing. Thus, on the face of it, there 
is nothing in those models to explain imperfect substi-
tution between outside and inside money. 
The same difficulties arise in the context of models 
with transactions costs imposed on various market 
trades. Hicks (1935) seemed to advocate such an ap-
proach and, indeed, spelled out the main ingredients 
of inventory models of money demand. But, in such 
models also, questions about possible substitution of 
inside for outside money are left unanswered. 
It seems, therefore, that we should either abandon 
the imperfect substitution of inside for outside money or 
somehow be explicit about the barriers to such substitu-
tion and in so doing abandon the perfect securities 
market assumption of those models. Either has impor-
tant implications. The first turns those models into ones 
that do not meet the Hicksian challenge. The second 
gets us into a very different class of models in which, 
among other things, propositions like Ricardian equiva-
lence fail because the perfect credit market has been 
abandoned. Today, I want to pursue the first route. My 
suggestion—which in the title is referred to as an 
oversimplifying suggestion—is that there are no natural 
barriers that limit substitution between privately issued 
inside money, on the one hand, and outside or govern-
ment-issued money, on the other hand. To explain this 
suggestion, I want to begin by describing in some detail 
the kind of private intermediation envisaged by it. 
The Oversimplification 
The kind of rate-of-return discrepancies that concern 
us are those between money-like assets and default-
free securities. To begin, it is helpful to be specific and 
talk about currency, on the one hand, and certain kinds 
of government debt, on the other hand, debt which I will 
treat as being nominally default free—that is, as being 
sure titles to currency in the future. First, I want to 
identify features of such debt that would seem to make 
it a perfect substitute for currency. Then, given that 
actual debt does not satisfy those features, I want to 
consider whether private intermediation could produce 
those features. 
Consider, then, government debt which is pure 
discount debt, which is payable to the bearer, and which 
has face values that match those of medium-size-
denomination currency. Let us also make this debt 
portable so that although distinguishable from curren-
cy, say, by its color, it is of similar size and has similar 
wear and tear properties. As described, this debt differs 
from currency in only one objective respect; it consists 
of promises to currency at or after some specified future 
date, for example, a year from issue date. The question 
before us is as follows: Conditional on such debt and 
non-interest-bearing currency coexisting, what would 
be the discount on the debt? 
The answer I favor is that such debt, if it coexisted 
with currency, would sell at face value, at no discount, 
and be used interchangably with currency. A loose 
argument for this answer goes like this. Consider first 
what happens at maturity. At maturity this debt is a 
demand claim on currency and, so, at that time becomes 
equivalent to currency. Given what I assumed about its 
physical characteristics, it should function as currency 
from then on. Consider next what happens at a time 
very close to the maturity date, so close that few if any 
transactions occur between then and the maturity date. 
If the debt was going at a discount then, almost 
everyone would prefer it to acquiring actual currency at 
that time, because the debt will appreciate and the 
currency will not. Therefore, in order for such debt and 
currency to coexist at that time, the debt must be 
accepted at no discount. In other words, it takes on its 
currency-like character at some time prior to maturity. 
But if so, then we can repeat the argument and, working 
backwards, conclude that the debt takes on its curren-
cy-like character when it is issued. 
In the United States, which is the only country I know 
a little about, the government does not issue the kind of 
debt I just described. (Of course, if I am right in what I 
just asserted, that is not at all surprising. Why go to so 
much trouble to issue what turns out to be another form 
of currency?) Until a few years ago, the United States 
issued Treasury bills which were like the debt described 
above except that they were issued in very large denom-
inations, no smaller than $10,000. Now Treasury bills 
are all book entry. The United States also issues some 
small-denomination savings bonds, but these are explic-
itly nonnegotiable and, so, are certainly not payable to 
the bearer. 
Features like nonpayability to the bearer and large 
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denomination are enough to explain why an individual 
does not regard such securities as close substitutes for 
the small amounts of currency that individuals typically 
hold. But stopping there and saying that that explains 
why the debt can bear substantial interest would be like 
saying that a very large per-pound discount on salt 
purchased in hundred-pound sacks is explained by the 
fact that most people cannot lift a hundred pounds. An 
adequate explanation should take into account that the 
best way to break hundred-pound sacks into reasonably 
sized packages does not involve each individual doing it 
at home in his or her kitchen. Analogously, the best way 
for substitution between government interest-bearing 
debt and government currency to occur may be not by 
having individuals do it directly, but, instead, through 
the activities of financial intermediaries. 
Suppose, then, that government debt is like U.S. 
Treasury bills—large-denomination, pure-discount 
debt—and consider a financial intermediary that oper-
ates as follows. It is like a money market mutual fund in 
that it holds only Treasury bills as assets. Its liabilities, 
however, are designed to compete with government 
currency—they are small denomination, payable to the 
bearer, discount securities issued in maturities that 
match those of the Treasury bills held. Such an in-
termediary is perfectly hedged so that, fraud aside and 
even without reserves, its notes are as safe as the 
securities it holds as backing for them. Therefore, if we 
continue to abstract from fraud, such an activity gives 
rise to the same situation as prevails if the government 
itself issues small-denomination, bearer securities. If 
we suppose that, as part of its business, this inter-
mediary takes actions that prevent fraud, then I con-
clude, exactly as I did for small-denomination, bearer 
securities issued by the government, that the bearer 
notes issued by such intermediaries would sell at par 
and be used interchangably with currency, if the two 
were to coexist. 
Since the revenue for this intermediation business 
comes from buying default-free securities at a discount 
and issuing bearer notes at par, in an equilibrium with 
free entry the discount on default-free securities like 
Treasury bills must be small enough so that it is not 
profitable to expand this activity. That is the case when 
the discount is just sufficient to cover the costs of 
engaging in the business. In other words, in the presence 
of such intermediation, if currency and government 
debt of the Treasury bill kind are to coexist, then the 
yield or nominal rate of return on the latter is bounded 
above by the least costly way of operating such a 
financial intermediation business. 
Rough estimates of the magnitude of this cost can be 
inferred from two sources: the cost of operating finan-
cial intermediaries in existing intermediary activities 
and the cost of maintaining currency. Many financial 
intermediaries—common stock and money market 
mutual funds—operate at spreads of 1 percent or less. 
As for the cost of maintaining currency, in the United 
States, for all but the smallest denominations the cost is 
less than 1 percent of the outstanding stock. These 
observations suggest that the upper bound on nominal 
interest rates implied by our hypothetical intermedia-
tion is quite low, on the order of 1 or 2 percent per year. 
We generally do not observe nominal interest rates 
satisfying such a bound. Nor do we generally observe 
the kind of intermediation I just described. An obvious 
explanation of the latter is that it is explicitly prohibited 
in most countries and has been at most times. I suspect 
that most countries have laws or regulations that in 
intent and effect are similar to those of the following 
Canadian statute: 
Every bank or other person who issues or reissues, makes, 
draws or endorses any bill, bond, note, cheque or other 
instrument, intended to circulate as money, or to be used as 
a substitute for money, is guilty of an offense against this 
Act. (Banks and Banking Law Revision Act, 1980, 29, 
Eliz. 2, c. 40, s. 311.1) 
The oversimplifying suggestion ascribes to such restric-
tions the fact that nominal interest rates do not always 
satisfy some low upper bound. 
Some Positive Implications of the Suggestion 
Now I want to describe some of the positive implica-
tions of this suggestion. The sharp implications are 
those that are implied under laissez-faire in intermedi-
ation. They follow from noting that with nominal 
interest rates bounded above by some rather low con-
stant, real returns on all assets, including those on 
objects we choose to call monies, must move together. 
Another way to put this is that under laissez-faire, an 
attempt to explain the values of all assets by store-of-
value considerations should work well. 
In some regards, a world with real returns on all 
assets forced into approximate equality seems bizarre. 
Either it is a world in which currency as we know 
it—non-interest-bearing currency—continues to be 
valued and all real returns are driven down to approxi-
mately that on such currency, or it is a world in which 
currency as we know it disappears and the currency we 
use is different stuff, perhaps claims denominated in 
terms of some commodity like ounces of gold, and 
21 paying interest, perhaps by selling at a discount and 
appreciating as a maturity date is approached. Such 
extreme possibilities were described by Samuelson 
(1947, p. 123) who, however, was not thinking of 
approximate rate-of-return equality being produced 
simply by laissez-faire in intermediation: 
It is true that in a world involving no transaction friction 
and no uncertainty, there would be no reason for a spread 
between the yield on any two assets, and hence there would 
be no difference in the yield on money and on securities. 
Hicks concludes, therefore, that securities will not bear 
interest but will accommodate themselves to the yield on 
money. It is equally possible and more illuminating to 
suppose that under these conditions money adjusts itself to 
the yield of securities. In fact, in such a world securities 
themselves would circulate as money and be acceptable in 
transactions; demand bank deposits would bear interest, 
just as they often did in this country in the period of the 
twenties. And if money could not make the adjustment, as 
in the case of metal counters which Aristotle tells us are 
barren, it would pass out of use, wither away and die, 
become a free good. 
Each possibility may well seem strange. The view 
Samuelson favored seems strange because we may 
have difficulty conceiving of what is, in effect, a 
cashless society with all transactions being accom-
plished by the use of interest-bearing instruments. 
While we can easily conceive of the widespread use of 
debit cards with debits and credits made against 
interest-bearing accounts, we may wonder about their 
use in all transactions. Would there not remain a 
demand for currency-like objects, at least for small 
transactions? And for small transactions, would it not 
be costly and bothersome to have these objects be 
interest bearing? If we answer affirmatively, then we 
ought to entertain the Hicksian view that all yields fall 
to the yield on currency—net, however, of the costs of 
producing and maintaining the currency. In this regard, 
it should be noted that small-denomination currency is 
somewhat costly to produce and maintain. In the United 
States, for example, the cost of maintaining the stock of 
one-dollar bills—which remains in the form of paper 
despite attempts to introduce a one-dollar coin—is 
approximately 3 percent of the stock per year. Thus, if 
currency consists entirely of quite small-denomination 
objects, nominal interest rates higher than the 1 or 2 
percent mentioned above are consistent with laissez-
faire in intermediation. There are, moreover, other 
grounds for not dismissing too quickly the Hicksian 
view that, absent frictions, real returns would fall to the 
yield on currency. Although most economists tend to 
think in terms of intertemporal models—specifications 
of preferences and/or technologies—consistent with 
the Samuelson view, the evidence is far from clear-cut. 
In the United States, there have been long periods of 
very low nominal interest rates. One such period was 
from 1865 to 1913. During this period, national banks 
could issue notes provided they held as backing certain 
eligible government bonds. Since these notes circulated 
as non-interest-bearing currency, it is to be expected 
that the yield on the eligible bonds would have been 
driven down to a level consistent with zero profits on 
additional note issue. Yields on eligible bonds were 
quite low throughout the period. Moreover, throughout 
the period, some of the bonds eligible to be used as 
backing were held by the nonbank public, implying that 
market interest rates in general were tied to the yields 
on those eligible bonds. It is also to be noted that the 
period included both deflation and inflation—deflation 
from about 1873 to 1896, inflation at about 2 percent 
per year from 1896 to 1913. This suggests that real 
returns were adjusting to the real return on currency. 
Another period of very low nominal interest rates in the 
United States began in the 1930s and ended in the early 
1950s. 
Another kind of evidence that bears on whether 
preferences and technologies are consistent with all 
returns falling to the return on currency concerns hold-
ings of gold. There is considerable casual evidence that 
some gold has almost always been held purely as a store 
of value. Certainly, gold is being held as a store of value 
today. This implies that preferences and technologies 
are now consistent with the rate of return on gold 
holding its own vis-a-vis that on other assets. That 
being so, it seems farfetched to say that these conditions 
did not hold at other times—when gold happened to 
also serve as a medium of exchange. 
Some Normative Implications of the Suggestion 
I will now apply the Hicksian vision of a world without 
frictions—which I interpret as arising entirely from 
laissez-faire in intermediation—to consider two long-
standing issues in monetary economics: the welfare 
effects of inflation and the inefficiency of commodity 
money. To do this one needs an intertemporal model 
which permits there to be equilibria in which all real 
returns are equal to the return on money. Overlapping 
generations models permit this to happen, and the 
results I will be discussing should be understood as 
arising in the context of such models. 
In regard to the inefficiency of commodity money, it 
is helpful to recall Friedman's (1960, p. 5) remark 
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which, paraphrased slightly, is as follows: why expend 
resources to dig up gold simply in order to put it in a 
bank vault? This remark captures the inefficiency of a 
commodity money if the only use of gold once it is dug 
up is as an asset. In this case, the gold is a costly to 
produce outside money and the inefficiency is mea-
sured by the resources used in digging it up. If, however, 
gold has other potential uses, as an input into the 
production of things that yield utility, then matters are 
less straightforward. If it is assumed that turning gold 
into a utility-yielding use now interferes with doing so 
at a later time, then the above paraphrase captures the 
inefficiency of commodity money only if it is inter-
preted to mean that the gold remains in the vault 
forever. An extreme technology of this sort was as-
sumed by Sargent and me (1983). We assumed that 
gold could at any time be turned into a nondurable 
consumption good, but that each unit of gold could be 
used this way only once. With this sort of technology 
and with gold holding its own in terms of rate of return, 
there is nothing inefficient or even suboptimal about an 
equilibrium path in which gold is held for a finite 
number of periods and then turned into consumption. 
Holding it forever is inefficient because then there is 
some consumption which is sacrificed. 
Notice that on this interpretation of the inefficiency 
of commodity money, the inefficiency is implied by an 
assumption about alternative uses of gold and the 
holding of gold forever and that it applies whether or 
not gold is a commodity money in the usual sense. Thus, 
if we interpret our world economy today as on a path 
where gold will be held in vaults forever, then we would 
conclude that that path is inefficient. This basis for 
attributing inefficiency to the holding of gold in vaults 
provides grounds for indicting a formal commodity 
money system only if we think that even more gold 
would be held permanently in vaults under such a 
system. 
A similar proviso arises regarding the welfare effects 
of inflation in a world with fiat money in which we 
regard inflation as being produced by money-financed 
deficits. With money holding its own in terms of rate of 
return, the usual wedge-type arguments regarding in-
efficiency do not apply. Instead, nonoptimality arises 
from all real returns being driven down below the 
natural growth rate permanently. In the context of a 
model with the usual one-good neoclassical technolo-
gy, nonoptimality is synonymous with a Tobin-Mundell 
effect that drives the capital-labor ratio beyond the 
golden rule point permanently. With money holding its 
own in terms of rate of return, no distortion accom-
panies an inflation known to be temporary. 
Finally, I want to say a word about the implications 
of the view I have been discussing for open market 
operations. Not surprisingly, the view I have been dis-
cussing leaves little scope for monetary policy in the 
sense of open market operations. With private inter-
mediation keeping nominal interest rates low, it is as if 
we have a liquidity trap, with the trap produced through 
variations in the amount of privately supplied inside 
money. 
A more detailed picture of this lack of scope for open 
market operations would go as follows. Suppose the 
money consists of small-denomination, payable-to-
the-bearer notes, and suppose there is a common and 
constant average-cost technology for producing and 
maintaining such notes—common to both the govern-
ment and the private sector. Then an open market 
operation would do no more than shift the location of 
the intermediation between the private sector and the 
government or central bank. It would affect neither 
interest rates nor the price level nor anything else. In 
particular, there would not be any effects on the 
government's budgetary position. Thus, for example, if 
the government expands its intermediation, then its 
interest payments to the public fall, but the savings in 
interest payments are just matched by the increased 
costs of maintaining the higher real stock of govern-
ment currency. 
Now, admittedly, the common constant average-
cost assumption seems farfetched. It is, perhaps, more 
plausible that the provision of small-denomination, 
bearer notes is a decreasing-cost activity—maybe 
because the cost of inhibiting counterfeiting does not 
rise in proportion to the value of notes outstanding. 
While such considerations may justify a government 
monopoly on currency issue, they suggest that the 
problem of how the monopoly should be managed 
resembles the analogous problem for other decreasing-
cost industries. 
Legal Restrictions 
So far I have been discussing what the oversimplifying 
suggestion says would occur under laissez-faire. Now I 
want to discuss why we hardly ever observe laissez-
faire in intermediation—why legal restrictions have 
been so prevalent. 
One obvious motivation for legal restrictions on 
private intermediation is to enhance seigniorage possi-
bilities by increasing the demand for government cur-
rency. Many of the legal restrictions in place in the 
world today seem motivated by that consideration. 
23 A related, but more subtle motivation for legal re-
strictions arises in settings in which there is a potential 
for earning seigniorage not only on currency, but also 
on other government liabilities. There is such a poten-
tial if the government can sell bonds with a real return 
less than the growth rate. Bryant and I (1984) described 
one such setting—a stationary, pure-exchange, over-
lapping generations model in which all private saving 
ends up being in the form of government liabilities. We 
showed that if a positive real deficit could be financed 
by money issue only, the usual kind of seigniorage, then 
there are Pareto superior equilibria that have the same 
deficit being financed partly by bonds. The bonds are 
large-denomination securities, the presence of which, 
along with that of divisible money, implies that savers 
face a nonconstant return schedule on savings, a 
schedule which is increasing in the amount saved. This 
nonconstant schedule, which is synonymous with price 
discrimination, allows for better outcomes, given that 
the constant schedule would itself be distorting because 
a positive deficit is being financed. The nonconstant 
schedule is achieved by bonds which are available only 
in a minimum denomination and which pay a higher 
rate of return than that on divisible currency and by a 
legal restriction against intermediation of government 
bonds. The legal restriction prevents savers from get-
ting together and sharing the large-denomination 
bonds. If they could, then according to the model, only 
a constant return schedule on government liabilities 
would be possible. 
Seigniorage does not, however, seem to motivate all 
actual and suggested legal restrictions on private 
intermediation. It did not motivate Adam Smith's 
proposals that private banks be allowed to issue notes 
only in some substantial minimum denomination and 
only notes payable upon demand. Nor did it motivate 
proposals in the United States for high required reserves 
behind demand deposits or note issues. And it did not 
seem to motivate England's Bank Charter Act, often 
called Peel's Act, which gave the Bank of England a 
monopoly on note issue and set a marginal 100 percent 
reserve requirement against note issue. In a paper 
somewhat inaptly entitled "The Real-Bills Doctrine 
Versus the Quantity Theory: A Reconsideration," Sar-
gent and I (1982) poked fun at restrictions like those 
imposed by Peel's Act. We did so by interpreting the 
goal of the restrictions to be price stability and the 
restrictions themselves to be ones that force saving 
instruments for small savers to be 100 percent backed 
by outside money. In the context of an overlapping 
generations model, we imposed an endowment pattern 
that implied a fluctuating demand for private credit and 
showed that the restrictions would indeed stabilize the 
price level. They did so by separating the market for 
money, which had a stable demand under the restric-
tions, from the market for credit, which had a fluctu-
ating demand. However (and this is the sense in which 
we poked fun at the restrictions), this stable price level 
outcome, which is accompanied by a fluctuating nomi-
nal interest rate, is not Pareto optimal. In contrast, 
without the restrictions, there is an equilibrium with a 
fluctuating price level which is Pareto optimal. 
Of course, it is possible that our model was missing 
crucial features that justify the restrictions imposed by 
Peel's Act. Jevons (1918, pp. 307-8) in Money and the 
Mechanism of Exchange attempted to defend Peel's Act: 
The objectors to the Bank Charter Act urge that we want 
more currency, but they cannot really mean more metallic 
currency. We must look to changes in the law to increase 
the amount of specie in the country, and, as I have re-
marked, any one can get sovereigns if he has the needful 
gold 
What the currency theorists want, then, is not more 
gold, but more promises to pay gold. The Free-banking 
School especially argue that it is among the elementary 
rights of an individual to make promises, and that each 
banker should be allowed to issue as many notes as he can 
get his customers to take, keeping such a reserve of 
metallic money, as he thinks, in his own private discretion, 
sufficient to enable him to redeem his promises. But this 
free issue of paper representative money does not at all 
meet the difficulty of the money market, which is a want of 
gold, not of paper; on the contrary, an unlimited issue of 
paper would tend to reduce the already narrow margin of 
gold upon which we erect an enormous system of trade. 
Jevons was right in saying that the Free Banking School 
wanted more promises to pay gold. He may have been 
wrong in denying that such promises could meet the 
needs of the money market. The model just discussed 
has variable needs in the money market, which could 
arise either from a fluctuating demand for currency-
like assets or from a fluctuating demand for credit. In it, 
allowing credit instruments to take a currency-like 
form would fill the needs of the money market. 
Admittedly, however, if fluctuations in the needs of the 
money market arise in other ways—for example, from 
fluctuations in the degree to which promises to pay gold 
are trusted—then that model is not applicable. 
Evidence 
I now want to report and comment on some evidence 
concerning what is probably the weakest link in the 
private intermediation story I have told: the claim that 
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the public would accept privately issued, payable-to-
the-bearer claims on government currency or commod-
ity currency in the future as perfect substitutes for the 
currency itself. Unfortunately, the evidence consists 
mainly of nonquantitative reports of what seem like 
relatively minor incidents. 
Although there is considerable experience in both 
Great Britain and the United States with payable-to-
the-bearer notes issued by private banks, almost all of 
the experience occurs under the restriction that the 
issuer redeem notes on demand. The most substantial 
exception of which I am aware concerns notes with 
option clauses issued by Scottish banks during the 
period from 1760 to 1764. (Such notes and notes in 
denominations smaller than one pound were eliminated 
by legislation in 1765.) According to Rockoff (1986), 
the option clause permitted banks to refuse immediate 
redemption and to repay later with interest. When 
banks chose to exercise the option, they would date 
notes brought in for payment to establish the final 
redemption date. Rockoff reported that notes subject to 
the option clause were readily accepted as currency. He 
did not, however, report directly on what happened to 
notes on which a bank chose to exercise the option. 
Another kind of relevant evidence is experience with 
government securities that are payable to the bearer 
and are titles to government currency in the future. 
Although such experience does not bear on whether the 
public would trust private promises to government 
currency in the future, it does throw light on how claims 
to currency in the future are treated. On this matter, the 
evidence is mixed. 
One incident concerns the issue in India about four 
years ago of payable-to-the-bearer securities maturing 
in ten years and paying simple interest at 2 percent a 
year. The main attraction of these securities was that 
they were exempt from all taxes. A newspaper reported 
that the bonds, which the government had expected to 
be discounted, began to command a premium of 20 
percent or more and passed from hand to hand in lieu of 
cash. 
A related incident concerns U.S. experience with 
Liberty Bonds, which were issued during World War I 
as bearer securities. In this case, the evidence that such 
bonds circulated as currency from time to time comes 
from complaints by the government. The Secretary of 
the Treasury issued a statement entitled "On the Evils 
of Exchanging Merchandise for Liberty Bonds." The 
statement began as follows. "It has been brought to my 
attention that numbers of merchants throughout the 
country are offering to take Liberty Bonds at par, or 
even in some cases at a premium, in exchange for 
merchandise." The statement went on to decry the prac-
tice, explaining that it was not the intent of the gov-
ernment that these bonds substitute for currency, but 
rather that the bond issues were intended to stimulate 
saving. 
Finally, Makinen and Woodward (1986) reported on 
some French experience with small-denomination, pay-
able-to-the-bearer government bonds. Beginning in 
1915 and until 1927, the French government made 
available interest-bearing securities sold at discount 
and in a variety of denominations, including some quite 
small denominations, and with maturities of three 
months, six months, and one year. The authors reported 
that notes could be obtained at the fixed discount prices 
at all banks and post offices and at numerous local 
offices of the finance ministry. They also reported that 
in most years of their existence, the quantity outstand-
ing was comparable to that of the currency, which 
consisted of notes of the Bank of France. The authors 
cited as evidence that the securities were not treated as 
perfect substitutes for Bank of France notes a reported 
incident in which it seemed impossible to carry out 
transactions using these securities. More damaging to 
the view I have been describing is the mere coexistence 
of these securities and Bank of France notes, with the 
former available at a discount. According to that view, 
either Bank of France notes should have disappeared— 
all of them being used to purchase the interest-bearing 
notes—or government offices should have run out of 
the interest-bearing notes and been unable to meet the 
demand for them. Neither seemed to happen. 
I can offer only two possible explanations. First the 
interest-bearing notes were not well designed to circu-
late as currency at their face value because the promi-
nent number on them, and the one which was in a 
convenient denomination, was their selling price, not 
their face value. More serious, perhaps, is the possibility 
that the discount notes were not viewed as default-free 
claims to Bank of France notes. Makinen and Wood-
ward (1986, p. 264) themselves suggested this when 
they remarked that there were "periodic crises" in the 
1920s during which the interest-bearing notes "were 
allowed by the public to run off and be replaced by 
Bank of France notes." 
Concluding Remarks 
I now want to, as it were, come clean and explain my 
qualms about the oversimplifying suggestion. Earlier, 
I criticized money-in-the-utility-function and cash-in-
advance models because they were silent about the 
25 qualities an asset must possess in order that it yield 
utility or serve as a medium of exchange. Those theories 
simply assert that an outside or government money 
possesses those qualities and that other things do not. 
In a way, the oversimplifying suggestion does no better. 
It simply asserts that whatever are those qualities, they 
can be duplicated by privately provided inside money, 
by private intermediation. For example, in describing 
the oversimplifying suggestion, I repeatedly talked 
about properties like denomination and payability to 
the bearer, but I did not describe an explicit model in 
which there was a demand for assets with these quali-
ties. I did not because neither I nor anyone else, as far as 
I know, has such a model. 
My concern can be put differently. I have at best 
described a one-blade-of-the-scissors theory of nomi-
nal interest rates—the one blade being a perfectly 
elastic supply curve of currency-like assets implied by 
private intermediation. If such a supply curve is opera-
tive, then much can be said about the nature of 
equilibrium without saying much about demand. How-
ever, this presumes what is far from obvious: that it is 
legitimate to treat supply separately from demand in 
the contexts under discussion. Such separate treatment 
is legitimate if one set of features of the environment 
generates the demand for currency-like assets and an 
independent set generates the supply of private liabili-
ties that can meet that demand. It is quite possible, 
though, that the features that generate a demand for 
small-denomination, payable-to-the-bearer assets also 
have implications for supply and, in particular, imply 
that there are natural barriers to the substitution of 
inside for outside currency-like assets. Given this 
possibility, you can appreciate why I have chosen to 
label the one-blade theory an oversimplification sugges-
tion. 
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